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Note 
 
Amending Title VII to Safeguard the Viability of 
Retaliation Claims 
Brandon Wheeler* 
From 1999 until 2009, Mischelle Richter worked as a store 
manager at Advance Auto Parts, Inc.1 After reporting to her 
supervisor that some of her coworkers were engaging in various 
transgressions, the supervisor demoted Ms. Richter from the 
store manager position.2 Four days after the demotion, Ms. 
Richter filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), alleging race and sex discrimination.3 
Seven days after filing the EEOC charge, Advance Auto Parts 
terminated Ms. Richter.4 The EEOC eventually dismissed the 
charge, and Ms. Richter filed a suit in federal district court.5 
However, instead of alleging the charges found within her orig-
inal EEOC complaint, Ms. Richter alleged that Advance Auto 
Parts had illegally retaliated against her for filing a charge, a 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 The dis-
trict court dismissed Ms. Richter’s complaint for failure to ex-
haust administrative remedies.7
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2011, 
University of Minnesota. Thank you to Professor Stephen Befort for his inval-
uable insight and guidance. Many thanks also to the board and staff of the 
Minnesota Law Review for their help in publishing this piece and for the 
pleasure of working together. Special thanks to Todd and Laura Wheeler for 
their encouragement over the years, and to Vicky for her unwavering support. 
Copyright © 2013 by Brandon Wheeler. 
 The Eighth Circuit affirmed 
that holding, reasoning that a retaliation claim was an act “dis-
crete” from the discriminatory actions complained of in an 
 1. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 849 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 850. 
 5. Id. at 849. 
 6. Id. at 849–50. 
 7. Id. at 851. 
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EEOC charge.8 Under the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit, each 
discrete act requires review by the EEOC.9
While some circuits have held that post-EEOC-filing dis-
criminatory acts are “discrete acts” and require an additional 
EEOC charge,
 
10 others have held that some post-EEOC-filing 
discriminatory acts are “reasonably related” to the original 
EEOC charge and do not require an additional EEOC charge.11 
The circuit split arose from the Supreme Court’s holding in Na-
tional Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan that discrete dis-
criminatory acts which preceded an EEOC charge by more than 
300 days were barred by the statute of limitations, even if the 
discriminatory acts were reasonably related.12 Courts have in-
terpreted Morgan two different ways: (1) Morgan should be 
read narrowly to apply only to pre-EEOC-charge discriminatory 
acts; or (2) Morgan should be read broadly to apply to all dis-
criminatory acts that are “discrete acts.”13
The Richter holding is particularly problematic because it 
requires double litigation.
 Mrs. Richter’s case 
exemplifies the problems with this circuit split and evidences 
the growing administrative and procedural mess that is Title 
VII litigation.  
14
 
 8. Id. at 852–53. 
 It potentially leads to a logistical 
nightmare in which a plaintiff must concurrently navigate both 
the EEOC process and the civil litigation process while at the 
same time ensuring that the stringent statute of limitations 
 9. Id. at 853. 
 10. See id. at 852; see also Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th 
Cir. 2003).  
 11. See Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 304 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that a retaliation claim was reasonably related to the EEOC charge 
and therefore did not require a second EEOC charge to be filed). 
 12. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002) (“Each 
incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision 
constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’ . . . [such 
that a plaintiff] can only file a charge to cover discrete acts that ‘occurred’ 
within the appropriate time period.”). 
 13. See Richter, 686 F.3d at 858 (Bye, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
 14. In a situation where the EEOC issued a right to sue letter for an ini-
tial act of discrimination, and the employee is subsequently retaliated against, 
the employee will have an EEOC proceeding (for the retaliation) and a lawsuit 
(for the initial discriminatory act) concurrently active. See id. at 859 (“Requir-
ing prior resort to the EEOC would mean that two charges would have to be 
filed in a retaliation case—a double filing that would serve no purpose except 
to create additional procedural technicalities . . . .” (quoting Gupta v. E. Tex. 
State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981))).  
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under Title VII is not violated.15
I.  THE FRAMEWORK OF TITLE VII AND THE 
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
DOCTRINE   
 This Note argues that Title VII 
should be amended to alleviate the unnecessary burden im-
posed by this new addition to the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies doctrine. Part I examines the framework of Title VII 
and its current treatment of the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies doctrine regarding retaliation. Part II argues that 
Richter and its companion decisions align logically with the 
statute and precedent but cause unnecessary hardships and in-
equity. Part III proposes amending Title VII in order to exempt 
post-charge retaliation from the requirement of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. 
This Note will first explore the history and framework of 
Title VII, including the EEOC’s procedural requirements in fil-
ing a charge and the issuance of a right-to-sue letter. This Note 
will then identify the important case law regarding the exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies doctrine. Prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Morgan, most circuits were reluctant to en-
force the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement to 
retaliation claims. Following Morgan, however, circuits split 
about how broadly to construe the requirement in retaliation 
claims. 
A. THE PURPOSE AND GOALS OF TITLE VII AND ITS ANTI-
RETALIATION PROVISION 
Congress introduced Title VII as part of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 with the purpose of eliminating the effects of em-
ployment discrimination.16 Congress intended to draft Title VII 
in such a way that it could provide individuals with effective 
protection against discriminatory practices by employers.17
 
 15. An employee must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of 
when the discriminatory act occurred; if the individual has filed a similar 
complaint with a state human rights agency, the EEOC charge must be filed 
within 300 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006). After the EEOC has issued a 
right to sue letter, an employee will only have 90 days to commence a civil suit 
before that action is barred. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e)(1) (2013). 
 Ti-
 16. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 650 (1987). 
 17. See 110 CONG. REC. 1540 (1964) (statement of Rep. Lindsay) (“This 
bill is designed for the protection of individuals. When an individual is 
wronged he can invoke the protection to himself, but if he is unable to do so 
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tle VII purports to accomplish this by making it an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to take an adverse em-
ployment action against an individual because of his or her 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.18 An “adverse em-
ployment action” includes a refusal to hire or a discharge.19 Ti-
tle VII also makes it unlawful for an employer to segregate or 
classify its employees in any way that would lead to an adverse 
employment action.20 Finally, and most relevant to this Note, 
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against 
an employee for opposing an unlawful employment action (the 
“opposition clause”) or for making a charge, testifying, assist-
ing, or participating in any manner in a Title VII investigation 
or proceeding (the “participation clause”).21 By banning retalia-
tion against individuals who perform the types of duties found 
in the participation clause, Congress intended to maintain “un-
fettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”22 Without 
protections from retaliation, employers who seek to deter Title 
VII claims would have an incentive to fire employees who had 
Title VII claims.23
The “opposition clause” has been read narrowly to only in-
clude a complainant’s “active and purposive” conduct.
 
24 In con-
trast, the protections of the “participation clause” have been 
construed much more broadly, with the Second Circuit going so 
far as to hold that defending oneself against charges of discrim-
ination is a protected activity under Title VII.25
 
because of economic distress or because of fear then the Federal Government 
is authorized to invoke that individual protection for that individual . . . .”). 
 For either type 
of retaliation, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case: (1) 
she must show that she engaged in an activity protected by Ti-
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
 21. Id. § 2000e-3(a). For a general overview of the two different clauses, 
see EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1175–76 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 22. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). 
 23. Id. at 345–46. 
 24. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 282 (2009). 
 25. Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Merritt v. 
Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that involun-
tary participation in a Title VII proceeding is protected from retaliation); 
Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 
1989) (stating that the “participation” clause is an exceptionally broad protec-
tion). But see also Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 267–68 (3d Cir. 
2006) (holding that the participation clause does not protect individuals who 
file facially invalid claims). 
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tle VII, (2) that the employer took an adverse employment ac-
tion against her, and (3) that there was a causal connection be-
tween the two.26
B. EEOC FILING AND REVIEW OF THE CHARGE 
 Before a plaintiff can pursue any of the above 
claims in federal court, however, she must satisfy certain pro-
cedural requirements. 
Congress created the EEOC in order to oversee proceedings 
arising under Title VII, among other tasks.27 When a discrimi-
natory act occurs, the aggrieved employee must first file a 
charge with the EEOC before she can sue in federal court, a 
doctrine known generally as the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.28
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and 
eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice oc-
curred . . . except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice 
with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted 
proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or 
seek relief from such practice . . . within three hundred days after the 
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days 
after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated 
the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earli-
er . . . .
 The relevant provision states:  
29
This requirement encourages the settlement of discrimination 
disputes through the EEOC’s processes instead of the courts, a 
purpose which would be defeated if an individual could litigate 
a claim not previously presented to and investigated by the 
EEOC.
 
30
The EEOC has passed many regulations regarding how an 
aggrieved employee should present a Title VII claim.
  
31 On the 
charge form provided by the EEOC, an employee must indicate 
what they believe their discrimination is based on, and can 
choose from the following options: race, color, sex, religion, na-
tional origin, age, disability, retaliation, genetic information, or 
other.32
 
 26. Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 The employee must also provide “[a] clear and concise 
statement of the facts, including pertinent dates, constituting 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2006).  
 28. Id. § 2000e-5(e)(1).  
 29. Id. (emphasis added).  
 30. Miller v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 755 F.2d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 31. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6–.12 (2013). 
 32. EEOC, CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION (FORM 5) (Nov. 2009), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/forms/upload/form_5.pdf. 
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the alleged unlawful employment practices.”33 Within ten days 
of the employee’s filing of the charge, the employer must be 
served with notice of the charge.34
Following receipt of the charge and notice to the adverse 
parties, Title VII requires the EEOC to investigate the charge 
in order to determine whether “reasonable cause” exists.
  
35 Such 
a finding represents an administrative determination of fact 
that it is reasonable to believe that the discriminatory act oc-
curred.36 If the EEOC determines that reasonable cause exists, 
then Title VII requires the EEOC to “endeavor to eliminate any 
such alleged unlawful employment practice.”37 Such an endeav-
or includes the option for the EEOC to commence a civil case on 
behalf of a claimant.38 This does not mean that Title VII re-
quires the EEOC to fully litigate the claim;39 alternatively, it 
can resolve the issue through negotiated settlements.40 Howev-
er, as is nearly always the case,41 the EEOC may find that no 
probable cause exists.42
 
 33. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(3). The specific contents of a charge are deter-
mined by EEOC regulations. See generally id. § 1601.6–.29. 
 If this is the case, then the EEOC will 
usually not bring suit or attempt to reach a settlement on be-
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). 
 35. Id. § 2000e-5(b). The EEOC does not make a finding of cause or no 
cause in all charges, as individuals can request their right-to-sue letter within 
180 days regardless of where the EEOC is in the investigation. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1601.28(a)(1). 
 36. EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 526 F. Supp. 974, 976 (N.D. Ill. 
1981). Even if the EEOC finds that a discriminatory act occurred, it cannot be 
used in subsequent proceedings without consent of the persons concerned. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).  
 38. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.27. 
 39. The EEOC is not required to bring suit on behalf of the aggrieved in-
dividual, even if it finds reasonable cause. See id. (“The Commission may bring 
a civil action against any respondent named in a charge . . . .”) (emphasis add-
ed). 
 40. Id. § 1601.20; see also Definitions of Terms, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ 
definitions.cfm (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) (explaining the EEOC’s role as a 
party to negotiated settlements).  
 41. In 2011, the EEOC found reasonable cause in only 3.8 percent of all 
Title VII cases (including charges filed concurrently under the ADA, ADEA, 
and EPA). Enforcement and Litigation Statistics: Title VII Charges, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/ 
enforcement/titlevii.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Litigation Sta-
tistics]. The year 2001 had the highest percent of the past fifteen years, with 
the EEOC finding reasonable cause in 9.2 percent of Title VII cases. Id. 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 
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half of the plaintiff.43 Instead, the EEOC will issue a right-to-
sue letter.44
C. THE RIGHT-TO-SUE LETTER 
 
For a vast majority of aggrieved employees, the right-to-
sue letter comes following a finding of no probable cause.45 The 
content of the right-to-sue letter includes the EEOC’s decision 
and authorizes the aggrieved individual to bring a civil action 
in federal court for violation of Title VII.46 Although the EEOC 
retains the right to intervene in the lawsuit,47 as a practical 
matter the EEOC has neither the time nor the resources to do 
so.48 The right-to-sue letter requires the aggrieved individual to 
bring their civil action within 90 days of its receipt.49 If she does 
not bring the action within that statutory period, Title VII bars 
her from bringing suit, absent equitable tolling.50 Equitable 
tolling has been allowed, for example, if a claimant was tricked 
into letting the deadline expire,51 or if the EEOC gave inade-
quate notice of the statute of limitations.52
 
 43. Id. (“If the Commission determines after . . . investigation that there 
is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the 
charge.”). However, the EEOC reserves the right to offer assistance to individ-
uals even after they have received their right-to-sue letter. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1601.28(b)(4). 
 Barring these equi-
table exceptions, the complainant must comply with the ex-
haustion of administrative remedies doctrine. 
 44. The EEOC can issue a right-to-sue letter in two different ways: either 
by notice after 180 days of the filing of the charge or immediately following 
disposition of the charge. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28. 
 45. Over two-thirds of the nearly 83,000 resolutions in fiscal year 2011 
were dispositions due to the EEOC finding no reasonable cause. Litigation 
Statistics, supra note 41.  
 46. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e). 
 47. Id. § 1601.28(a)(4), (b)(4). 
 48. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF A NA-
TIONAL CONTACT CENTER SOLUTION FOR EEOC (2003), available at http:// 
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/archive/9-8-03/center.html (“The EEOC is a 
small, chronically understaffed agency.”). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006). 
 50. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (“[W]e 
have held that the statutory time limits applicable to lawsuits against private 
employers under Title VII are subject to equitable tolling.”). 
 51. See id. at 96 (“We have allowed equitable tolling in situations where 
. . . the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct 
into allowing the filing deadline to pass.”). 
 52. See Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 267–68 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The 
equitable tolling doctrine has been applied . . . when the EEOC’s notice of the 
statutory period was clearly inadequate.”). 
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D. THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine53 gives 
civil defendants an affirmative defense to claims arising under 
Title VII.54 Under this doctrine, if a plaintiff does not fully ex-
haust all of her administrative remedies, a defendant would 
succeed on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.55 
Courts have interpreted Title VII to mandate the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies since the naissance of Title VII juris-
prudence.56 There are two general requirements that must be 
fulfilled before a complainant has exhausted her administrative 
remedies: (1) the filing of a timely charge with the EEOC, and 
(2) receipt of a right-to-sue letter following the EEOC’s review 
of the case.57 In order for a charge to be valid, it must be com-
plete enough to allow the EEOC to have a fair opportunity to 
investigate the claims found in the charge.58
 
 53. See supra Part I.B (introducing the exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies doctrine). 
 If, for example, a 
claimant solely alleges sex discrimination in the charge to the 
EEOC but then attempts to sue for race discrimination, the 
EEOC would not have had an opportunity to investigate the 
race discrimination claim, and thus a court would find that the 
claimant did not exhaust her administrative remedies with re-
 54. See Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In Title VII 
actions, failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense 
in the nature of statute of limitations.”). 
 55. The Supreme Court has held that failures to comply with EEOC time 
requirements are not a jurisdictional prerequisite, but rather a statutory re-
quirement. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). 
 56. See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 523 (1972) (“A person claiming 
to be aggrieved by a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may 
not maintain a suit for redress in federal district court until he has first un-
successfully pursued certain avenues of potential administrative relief.” (cita-
tion omitted)).  
 57. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970)). 
 58. A valid charge must: (1) be timely; (2) be in writing, signed, and veri-
fied; and (3) be “sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe 
generally the action of practices complained of.” 2 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN ET 
AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 26–57 (5th ed. 2012) (quoting 29 
C.F.R. §§ 1601.9, 1601.12(b) (2013)). Beyond this minimum threshold, the 
EEOC prefers, but does not require, charges to contain five components: (1) 
the name and address of the employee making the charge; (2) the full name 
and address of the employer; (3) a clear and concise statement of the facts, in-
cluding pertinent dates; (4) the approximate number of persons employed by 
the employer; and (5) information about any related proceedings in other state 
or local agencies. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)). 
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gard to that claim.59
1. Pre-Morgan Treatment of the Exhaustion of Administrative 
Remedies Doctrine 
 However, certain types of claims were, pri-
or to Morgan, excepted from this rule.  
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan, most 
courts allowed claims arising out of “continuing violations” to 
escape the harshness of the exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies doctrine.60 “Continuing violations” could be both discrimi-
nation and retaliation claims.61 For example, some courts held 
that retaliation claims following the filing of an EEOC charge 
were “reasonably related to” and “growing out of” the original 
discriminatory act, and therefore constituted “continuing viola-
tions.”62 If, however, the retaliatory act occurred before any 
EEOC charge, complainants were required to include that re-
taliatory act in their EEOC charge.63
 
 59. Cf. Reynolds v. Solectron Global Servs., 358 F. Supp. 2d 688, 692–93 
(W.D. Tenn. 2005) (holding that the court did not have subject matter jurisdic-
tion over a race discrimination claim because the claim was filed with the 
EEOC after the complaint was filed with the court). 
 
 60. See Morgan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (“[T]he continuing violations doctrine, however, allows courts to 
consider conduct that would ordinarily be time barred ‘as long as the untimely 
incidents represent an ongoing unlawful employment practice.’” (quoting An-
derson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 1999))), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
536 U.S. 101 (2002). 
 61. See Oubichon v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 
1973) (“When an employee seeks judicial relief for incidents not listed in his 
original charge to the EEOC, the judicial complaint nevertheless may encom-
pass any discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations of the 
EEOC charge, including new acts occurring during the pendency of the charge 
before the EEOC.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(“[A] separate administrative charge is not prerequisite to a suit complaining 
about retaliation for filing the first charge.”), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in Luevano v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1030 (7th Cir. 2013); Brown v. Harts-
horne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 864 F.2d 680, 682 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
when a plaintiff alleges that she was retaliated against for filing an EEOC 
charge, she is not required to file another EEOC complaint); Kirkland v. Buf-
falo Bd. of Educ., 622 F.2d 1066, 1068 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that when a 
plaintiff sued for retaliation for filing an EEOC charge, “a second authoriza-
tion to sue was not required”). 
 63. See, e.g., Steffen v. Meridian Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 534, 545 n.2 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (“These cases [that held that retaliation arose after the charge had 
been filed] are distinguishable from the present case where the alleged retalia-
tory acts occurred before [the plaintiff’s] . . . charge of discrimination was filed 
and [the employer] was not given clear notice that retaliation was at issue.”). 
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Retaliation claims were given special protection for several 
reasons. Some courts insisted that the initial filing in such a 
situation satisfied Title VII’s intent.64 Others reasoned that 
public policy encourages the punishment of retaliatory ac-
tions.65 Still other courts argued that notice is an essential pur-
pose of requiring an EEOC claim, not adjudication, and that 
the EEOC’s first review of the claim puts an employer on notice 
for all reasonably related claims that follow.66 Regardless of 
their rationales, circuits unanimously held prior to Morgan 
that a post-charge retaliatory action was a “continuing viola-
tion” that did not necessitate an additional charge.67
2. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan drastically 
changed the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine 
under Title VII. The facts of Morgan are relatively simple. 
Morgan, a black male, filed discrimination and retaliation 
charges with the EEOC against his employer.68 In the EEOC 
charge, Morgan alleged acts that occurred within the past 300 
days,69 but he also alleged acts that occurred prior to that time 
period.70 The employer was successful in a motion for summary 
judgment in regards to all incidents that predated the 300-day 
mark.71
 
 64. See Gottlieb v. Tulane Univ., 809 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Re-
quiring [a plaintiff] to resort to the EEOC a second time on a retaliation claim 
would serve no purpose ‘except to create additional procedural technicalities 
when a single filing would comply with the intent of Title VII.’” (quoting Gupta 
v. E. Tex. State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981))). 
 The Ninth Circuit reversed, citing the continuing viola-
 65. See Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1312 (“[H]aving once been retaliated 
against for filing an administrative charge, the plaintiff will naturally be gun 
shy about inviting further retaliation by filing a second charge complaining 
about the first retaliation.”). 
 66. See EEOC v. St. Anne’s Hosp., 664 F.2d 128, 131 (7th Cir. 1981) (“A 
reasonable cause determination is not to adjudicate a claim but to notify an 
employer of the Commission’s findings. There is no requirement that the 
agency begin its investigation anew on discovering a reasonably related theory 
of liability.” (citation omitted)). 
 67. See Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992) (“All other cir-
cuits that have considered the issue have determined that a plaintiff may 
raise the retaliation claim for the first time in federal court. On consideration, 
we . . . adopt this position.”). 
 68. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002). 
 69. According to Title VII, a charge must be filed within 300 days after 
the unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006).  
 70. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 106. 
 71. Id. 
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tions doctrine.72 National Railroad petitioned, and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine, among other issues, the 
scope of the continuing violations doctrine.73
The Supreme Court distinguished between hostile envi-
ronment claims and discrete acts.
 
74 It recognized that acts oc-
curring outside the 300-day period could be part of a hostile en-
vironment claim.75 A hostile environment claim is one that by 
its very nature involves a series of separate acts that collective-
ly constitute an unlawful employment practice, such as an em-
ployer continuously calling its employee racial epithets.76 The 
Court, however, ultimately reversed in favor of the employer on 
the issue of continuing violations in non-hostile environment 
claims.77 It examined the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(e)(1): “A charge under this section shall be filed with-
in one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful em-
ployment practice occurred.”78 The Court found that “[t]here is 
simply no indication that the term ‘practice’ converts related 
discrete acts into a single unlawful practice for the purposes of 
timely filing.”79 The Court explicitly overruled the Court of Ap-
peal’s application of the continuing violations doctrine to acts 
that are “sufficiently related,” instead labeling such acts as dis-
crete acts.80 The Supreme Court explained its definition of dis-
crete acts within the meaning of the statute: “Discrete acts 
such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or 
refusal to hire are easy to identify. Each incident of discrimina-
tion and each retaliatory adverse employment decision consti-
tutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’”81
 
 72. Id. at 106–07. 
 
In effect, this holding requires complainants to file any com-
plaint based on a discrete act within the 180- or 300-day period 
after the act occurred. A complainant may include multiple dis-
 73. Id. at 108. 
 74. Id. at 115. 
 75. Id. at 118 (“The statute does not separate individual acts that are part 
of the hostile environment claim from the whole for the purposes of timely fil-
ing and liability.”). 
 76. Id. at 117 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)). 
 77. Id. at 113–14. 
 78. Id. at 109. 
 79. Id. at 111. 
 80. Id. at 114. 
 81. Id. 
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crete acts in her charge, but if the discrete acts are more than 
300 days apart, they require separate charges.82
3. The Post-Morgan Circuit Split 
 
The discrete acts doctrine implemented by the Supreme 
Court quickly led to a circuit split about whether Morgan 
should apply to post-EEOC filing discriminatory acts, particu-
larly retaliation. In Martinez v. Potter, the Tenth Circuit held 
that the rule was equally applicable to post-EEOC filing acts.83 
The Martinez Court firmly held that “Morgan abrogates the 
continuing violation doctrine as previously applied to claims of 
discriminatory or retaliatory actions by employers, and replac-
es it with the teaching that each discrete incident of such 
treatment constitutes its own ‘unlawful employment practice’ 
for which administrative remedies must be exhausted.”84 In ad-
dition, the Martinez Court reasoned that an employer should be 
on notice of the specific violation prior to a lawsuit in order to 
“facilitate internal resolution of the issue rather than promot-
ing costly and time-consuming litigation.”85
In Richter, the Eighth Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit’s 
holding. It reasoned that Title VII’s use of the word “the” in de-
scribing unlawful employment practices
 
86 showed that the “the 
complainant must file a charge with respect to each alleged un-
lawful employment practice.”87 The Richter Court determined 
that Morgan had effectively changed the continuing violations 
doctrine to the extent that it applied to post-EEOC filing dis-
criminatory acts, including retaliation.88 The court read Morgan 
as an admonishment to the circuits to follow statutory text, and 
interpreted the term “practice” similarly, holding that “[t]he 
term ‘practice’ no more subsumes multiple discrete acts when 
one of those acts occurs after the filing of an EEOC charge than 
it does when all acts occur before the charge is filed.”89
 
 82. Id. at 113. 
 A vivid 
 83. Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 84. Id. at 1210. 
 85. Id. at 1211. 
 86. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam) (“Title VII requires that a complainant must file a charge with 
the EEOC within 180 days ‘after the alleged unlawful employment practice 
occurred,’ and give notice to the employer of the circumstances of ‘the alleged 
unlawful employment practice.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006))). 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 852. 
 89. Id. 
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dissent argued that policy considerations supported an excep-
tion for post-filing retaliation claims from the requirement of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies,90 but the majority found 
that different policies,91 as well as the statute itself overrode 
those policy considerations.92
The Sixth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, held contrary 
to the Tenth Circuit, that retaliation for an EEOC filing does 
not require a second filing.
  
93 The Sixth Circuit made a distinc-
tion between the old continuing violations doctrine and retalia-
tion for filing an EEOC charge, arguing that retaliation for an 
EEOC filing was never part of the continuing violations doc-
trine to begin with.94 In doing so, it held that Morgan was not 
applicable to certain retaliatory acts.95
The Fourth Circuit, in Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., also 
held contrary to the Tenth Circuit. The Jones Court reasoned 
that Morgan only applied to discriminatory acts for the purpos-
es of starting the statute of limitations.
 
96 The Jones Court dis-
tinguished Morgan by stating: “[Morgan] does not purport to 
address the extent to which an EEOC charge satisfies exhaus-
tion requirements for claims of related, post-charge events.”97 
As opposed to the Sixth Circuit, the Jones Court argued that 
the continuing violations doctrine survived in post-charge dis-
criminatory actions.98
 
 90. Id. at 859 (“In concluding a plaintiff should not be required to file a 
new EEOC charge for retaliation claims arising after the filing, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, for example, emphasized the needless procedural barrier a contrary rule 
would require.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Eberle v. Gonzales, 
240 F. App’x 622, 628 (5th Cir. 2007))). 
 The court therefore held that its pre-
Morgan precedent survived to the extent that it related to post-
charge discriminatory acts, and that retaliation for an EEOC 
 91. Id. at 853 (“Exempting retaliation claims from the administrative 
framework established by Congress could frustrate the conciliation process, 
which we have called ‘central to Title VII’s statutory scheme.’” (quoting Wil-
liams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994))). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Delisle v. Brimfield Twp. Police Dep’t, 94 F. App’x 247, 254 (6th Cir. 
2004). 
 94. Id. at 253. 
 95. Id. (“Plaintiff before us is not looking to raise the issue of retaliatory 
acts that may have occurred prior to his filing of his EEOC claim that are 
statutorily time-barred. That was the issue in Morgan, and hence Morgan’s 
holding.”). 
 96. Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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charge is thus still exempted from the exhaustion require-
ment.99
The Eleventh and Second Circuits have both maintained 
their pre-Morgan precedents and held that a plaintiff is not re-
quired to bring a second EEOC charge for retaliation. Both cir-
cuits did so without even so much as a reference to Morgan.
 
100
The EEOC has taken the position that post-charge discrim-
inatory acts such as retaliation do not warrant the filing of a 
second charge.
 
101 It adopted this position in its Compliance 
Manual after seeing the circuit split that arose out of Mor-
gan.102 In the manual, the EEOC argues that Morgan should be 
read narrowly to not apply to post-charge discriminatory acts.103 
However, courts have held that the Compliance Manual does 
not determine the rights of parties,104 but instead serves merely 
as an internal guideline for the agency,105
 
 99. Id.  
 or at most a body of 
 100. Perhaps a reason that the Second Circuit did not discuss Morgan was 
because the defendant never argued in its appellate brief that Morgan over-
ruled the precedent; instead, the defendant merely tried to distinguish its case 
from the precedent on the facts. The appellate briefs in Thomas v. Miami Dade 
Public Health Trust, however, gave the Eleventh Circuit ample opportunity to 
consider the impact of Morgan; but the court opted to write a short, un-
published opinion that did not reference Morgan. See Thomas v. Miami Dade 
Pub. Health Trust, 369 F. App’x 19, 23 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is unnecessary 
for a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies prior to urging a retaliation 
claim growing out of an earlier charge . . . .” (quoting Gupta v. E. Tex. State 
Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981))); Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 151 
(2d Cir. 2003) (finding that a second charge is not required “where the com-
plaint is ‘one alleging retaliation by an employer against an employee for filing 
an EEOC charge’” (quoting Butts v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 
990 F.2d 1397, 1402–03 (2d Cir. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in Carter v. New 
Venture Gear, Inc., 310 F. App’x 454, 458 (2d Cir. 2009))). 
 101. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL 
SECTION 2: THRESHOLD ISSUES § 2-IV(C)(1)(a) (2009) [hereinafter COMPLI-
ANCE MANUAL SECTION 2], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/ 
threshold.html#2-IV-C-1-a (“A timely charge also may challenge related inci-
dents that occur after the charge is filed.”). 
 102. See Compliance Manual, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMIS-
SION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/compliance.cfm (last visited Nov. 4, 
2013). 
 103. See COMPLIANCE MANUAL SECTION 2, supra note 101, at n.185 (“Noth-
ing in Morgan suggests that a new charge must be filed when a charge chal-
lenging related acts already exists.”). 
 104. Hall v. EEOC, 456 F. Supp. 695, 702 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
 105. Sunbeam Appliance Co. v. Kelly, 532 F. Supp. 96, 99 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
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experience to which a court may resort to for guidance.106
II.  THE STATUTORY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL MERITS 
OF A STRICT READING OF TITLE VII AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES   
 De-
spite the EEOC’s definitive opinion on the matter, the Tenth 
and Eighth Circuits still hold that a post-charge retaliatory act 
must be included in an EEOC charge in order to fully exhaust 
administrative remedies, leaving complainants in the undesir-
able position of re-navigating the lengthy EEOC process while 
simultaneously pursuing a claim in federal court. 
Richter and Martinez provide a proper interpretation of Ti-
tle VII and Morgan: all claims of retaliation must be submitted 
to the EEOC for review before they can be litigated in federal 
court in order to satisfy the exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies doctrine. However, this proper interpretation is detri-
mental to Title VII claimants because it significantly hinders 
the viability of retaliation claims. In this part, this Note will 
first examine the statutory language of Title VII and the Su-
preme Court’s holdings in Morgan. Then, it will analyze the 
consequences of the proper interpretation for the viability of re-
taliation claims, as well as the implications for employers and 
employees in future Title VII litigation. 
A. INTERPRETATIONS OF TITLE VII AND MORGAN 
1. Statutory Language of Title VII 
When interpreting a statute, a court will first look to the 
plain meaning of the statute to determine if it is ambiguous.107
 
 106. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 n.9 
(2003). 
 
Looking at the three key words (“shall,” “practice,” and “the”) in 
the context of the entirety of § 2000e-5(e), it is clear that the 
plain language of the statute mandates the filing of an addi-
tional charge for post-charge retaliation. Even if this results in 
unfair outcomes, the Supreme Court has noted that “strict ad-
herence to the procedural requirements specified by the legisla-
 107. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1997); see also Conn. 
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[C]ourts must presume 
that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what 
it says there.”). 
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ture is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the 
law.”108
The relevant language of Title VII states: “A charge under 
this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days 
after the alleged unlawful employment practice oc-
curred . . . .”
  
109 This charge must be filed with the EEOC or the 
appropriate state or local agency.110 It is unambiguous that 
some kind of charge must be filed with the EEOC,111 as the 
statute’s usage of “shall” mandates.112
In the absence of a statutory definition of a term, courts 
will look to common usage of the term, such as a dictionary def-
inition.
 Rather, courts differ on 
the definition of the term “unlawful employment practice.” 
113 Although Title VII does not include the term “unlaw-
ful employment practice” in its list of definitions,114 it does de-
fine the term in §§ 2000e-2 and 2000e-3. Title VII partially 
defines, through examples, an “unlawful employment practice” 
as the (1) failure or refusal to hire or discharge any individual, 
(2) the limitation, segregation, or classification of an employee 
that would adversely affect her status as an employee, and (3) 
retaliation for opposing a practice or participating in a Title VII 
proceeding.115 Some of these definitions allow for a more expan-
sive interpretation of “unlawful employment practice” than 
others. For instance, a discharge is an unlawful employment 
practice that is easily temporally defined; it is usually a singu-
lar event.116
 
 108. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980). 
 On the other hand, segregation of employees is an 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006). 
 110. See id. § 2000e-5 (establishing the framework of the EEOC filing pro-
cess). 
 111. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (“[Title 
VII] specifies with precision the jurisdictional prerequisites that an individual 
must satisfy before he is entitled to institute a lawsuit. In the present case, 
these prerequisites were met when petitioner (1) filed timely a charge of em-
ployment discrimination with the Commission, and (2) received and acted up-
on the Commission’s statutory notice of the right to sue.”). 
 112. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 
26, 35 (1998). 
 113. CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1223 (11th 
Cir. 2001). 
 114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
 115. Id. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a). 
 116. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 
(2002) (“Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of trans-
fer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify.”); Int’l Union of Elec. Workers v. 
Robbins & Meyers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1976) (holding that a discharge 
was final rather than tentative). Even in more difficult cases, such as those 
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unlawful employment practice that by its nature can extend 
over days, months, or even years.117
Proponents of the Jones holding might argue that congres-
sional use of “practice” instead of a term such as “act” indicates 
that Congress intended for “practice” to be defined by its ordi-
nary usage, not by the statutory examples. Ordinary usage of 
“practice” would be “the customary, habitual, or expected pro-
cedure or way of doing something.”
 Because a singular unlaw-
ful employment practice like segregation extends over such a 
lengthy period of time, one could argue that Congress did not 
intend for the term “practice” to limit an act to a singular con-
crete event for the purpose of determining when the statute of 
limitations starts running. Rather, it would support a pre-
Morgan or Jones interpretation that allowed “reasonably relat-
ed” acts to constitute a singular unlawful employment practice.  
118 This definition implies a 
continuing act rather than a discrete act. However, in defining 
an “unlawful employment practice” Congress provided exam-
ples such as retaliation and segregation.119 Segregation is gen-
erally a continuing event, but retaliation can consist of a singu-
lar event, such as a discharge. Because both singular and 
continuing events are considered “unlawful employment prac-
tices,” the term cannot be confined to a simple dictionary defi-
nition. Instead, Morgan’s differentiation between discrete acts 
and continuing violations logically divides the different types of 
practices based on their temporal attributes.120
Title VII’s usage of “the” in “the alleged employment prac-
tice” is also instructive. Title VII mandates that a charge must 
  
 
involving a constructive discharge, there is still a singular event that defines 
the ultimate discharge. See Martin W. O’Toole, Note, Choosing a Standard for 
Constructive Discharge in Title VII Litigation, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 594 
(1986) (discussing Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan Ass’n, 509 F.2d 140 
(5th Cir. 1975), in which the court held an employee’s resignation constituted 
a constructive discharge). 
 117. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115 (“Hostile environment claims are differ-
ent in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct.”). 
For a discussion of segregation in the workforce and the amount of time and 
number of employees it can encompass, see Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 
480 U.S. 616, 621, 634 (1987). 
 118. Definition of Practice, OXFORD DICTIONARIES (2013), http:// 
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/practice?q=practice. 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 120. Morgan stated that “[Title VII] explains in great detail the sorts of ac-
tions that qualify as ‘[u]nlawful employment practices’ and includes among 
such practices numerous discrete acts.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111. The Morgan 
Court distinguishes between such discrete acts and hostile environment 
claims involving “repeated conduct” and a “cumulative effect.” Id. at 114–15. 
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be filed within 180 or 300 days after the alleged employment 
practice occurred.121 The Richter court found its usage persua-
sive because “the” is a definite article.122 The usage of “the” in-
dicates that a charge must be filed for each discriminatory 
practice.123
2. Interpretations of Morgan 
 If Congress had used “an,” for example, it would 
seem that a complainant would only have to file a charge relat-
ing to one discriminatory practice in order to satisfy the ex-
haustion requirements.  
While Morgan, Richter, and Martinez all recognize that the 
plain meaning of the statute mandates the filing of an addi-
tional charge for post-charge retaliation, Jones not only ignores 
the language of the statute124 but also dismisses the obvious in-
terpretation of Morgan. In Jones, the Fourth Circuit justified 
its holding by reading Morgan very narrowly to apply only 
when the “limitations clock . . . begins ticking” with regard to 
discrete acts.125 The Jones Court determined that Morgan 
therefore did not overrule its pre-Morgan jurisprudence,126 
which had held that post-charge discriminatory acts did not re-
quire a second filing.127
While it is true that Morgan did not directly contemplate a 
post-charge discriminatory act in its analysis, it was critical of 
the breadth of the continuing violations doctrine, stating, 
“There is simply no indication that the term ‘practice’ converts 
related discrete acts into a single unlawful practice for the pur-
poses of timely filing.”
 However, this narrow reading of Mor-
gan is erroneous. 
128
 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). 
 It also reversed the Court of Appeals’ 
holding that acts that are sufficiently related to the original act 
 122. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Jones v. Calvert Grp. Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 301–04 (4th Cir. 2009). In 
contrast, the Supreme Court in Mohasco rejected ignorance of statutory lan-
guage as a reason for overlooking the statute’s plain meaning and refused to 
adopt a less literal reading of the statute, regardless of an unfair result in the 
case. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 824–26 (1980). Richter also noted 
that “[t]he overriding message of Morgan was to follow statutory text.” 686 
F.3d at 852. 
 125. Jones, 551 F.3d at 303. 
 126. Id. at 303–04. 
 127. See Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that “a 
plaintiff may raise the retaliation claim for the first time in federal court”). 
 128. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111. 
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are not required to fall within the charge filing period.129 Ulti-
mately, the Morgan Court limited the continuing violations 
doctrine as it applies to all discrete acts, regardless of how 
closely related they are to another discrete act.130
Even given the commands of Morgan to follow the statuto-
ry text and to limit the continuing violations doctrine, the 
Jones Court largely dismissed Morgan, holding that Morgan 
only applies to pre-charge discriminatory acts.
  
131 The Jones 
Court did this because a narrow reading of Morgan was the on-
ly way to reach its desired conclusion. Under a broader reading 
of Morgan, the Jones Court would have to argue that post-
charge retaliation is not a discrete, singular act. This argument 
fails because common retaliatory acts such as discharge or re-
fusal to promote by their very nature may require only one sin-
gle act to occur.132 Under a broad reading, it does not matter 
that the retaliatory discharge is “related” to an earlier discrim-
inatory act;133 Morgan explicitly rejected the argument that re-
lated discrete acts can be converted into an “ongoing violation 
that can endure or recur over a period of time.”134
B. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A STRICT READING OF TITLE VII AND 
A BROAD READING OF MORGAN 
 Especially in 
conjunction with the plain meaning of Title VII, Morgan should 
be read broadly to require EEOC review of post-charge retalia-
tion. However, many negative consequences arise as a result of 
this reading. 
Retaliation following an initial EEOC charge is a type of 
discrimination distinct from most of the employment practices 
made unlawful by Title VII, and implicates conflicting goals of 
Title VII. In circuits that follow the strict statutory text of Title 
 
 129. Id. at 113; see Morgan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. 232 F.3d 1008, 
1015 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). 
 130. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113.  
 131. The Jones Court’s discussion of Morgan took up less than one page of 
text. Jones, 551 F.3d at 303. 
 132. For a discharge, there is a single discriminatory event: the employee is 
fired from employment. In contrast, a hostile environment claim usually in-
cludes a series of acts: the very nature of this type of claim is the “cumulative 
effect of individual acts.” Luciano v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 
308, 318 (D. Mass. 2004) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115). 
 133. “Relatedness” was the very basis of the continuing violation doctrine: 
it allowed a claim to survive the statute of limitations if a plaintiff showed 
that there were a series of related acts, one of which fell within the 180-day 
period. Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971, 979 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 134. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110–11. 
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VII, employers have gained certain advantages. However, seri-
ous negative consequences exist that damage an employee’s op-
portunity to pursue all of her claims.  
1. Retaliation Claims and Conflicting Goals of Title VII 
A post-charge retaliation claim possesses unique qualities 
that differentiate it from other unlawful employment practices 
covered by Title VII. Before a claim for post-charge retaliation 
can arise, an original EEOC claim must have been filed.135 By a 
strict reading of Title VII and a broad reading of Morgan, an 
individual must file a second claim and receive a right-to-sue 
letter before she can sue for retaliation.136
The anti-retaliation provision by its very nature prohibits 
discrimination by enforcing fair procedure, not by directly ban-
ning discrimination.
  
137 It does this through “[m]aintaining un-
fettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”138 This con-
cern implicates two conflicting purposes of Title VII. First, 
courts have read Title VII’s creation of the EEOC to encourage 
employers and employees to engage in conciliation efforts be-
fore coming to federal court.139 Further, Congress strengthened 
conciliatory efforts in 1972 by giving the EEOC the power to 
commence civil suits if voluntary compliance failed.140
 
 135. See Gupta v. E. Tex. State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981) (“It 
is the nature of retaliation claims that they arise after the filing of the EEOC 
charge.”). 
 The filing 
 136. See id. (“Requiring prior resort to the EEOC would mean that two 
charges would have to be filed in a retaliation case . . . .”). 
 137. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 54 (2006) 
(“The antidiscrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are 
not discriminated against because of their status, while the antiretaliation 
provision seeks to prevent an employer from interfering with an employee’s 
efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”). 
 138. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). 
 139. See Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 853 (8th Cir. 
2012) (per curiam) (“Exempting retaliation claims from the administrative 
framework established by Congress could frustrate the conciliation process, 
which we have called ‘central to Title VII’s statutory scheme.’” (quoting Wil-
liams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994))). 
 140. Many civil rights groups in the 1960s referred to the EEOC as a 
“toothless tiger” because of its lack of an enforcement mechanism. 1965–1971: 
A “Toothless Tiger” Helps Shape the Law and Educate the Public, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1965 
-71/index.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); see also Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. 
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 358–66 (1977) (discussing the legislative history of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act, which gave the EEOC additional en-
forcement powers); Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) 
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of the charge itself also serves conciliatory purposes, as it puts 
the employer on notice of the claim so that it can commence in-
ternal resolution of the issue.141 This conciliatory purpose is 
clearly satisfied by a strict reading of Title VII, as it gives the 
EEOC the opportunity to review and conciliate all retaliatory 
acts.142
The second purpose implicated by post-charge retaliation is 
reducing discrimination in general. The EEOC relies heavily on 
the availability of private lawsuits in order to reduce discrimi-
nation;
 
143 in 2011, 31.4 percent of charges filed under Title VII 
with the EEOC contained a claim of retaliation.144 Without a 
robust anti-retaliation mechanism, it would be difficult to effec-
tively combat discrimination in the workplace, as employees 
would be hesitant to file charges against their employers.145
2. Implications for Employers 
 
While it is clear that a strong anti-retaliation provision is nec-
essary to reduce discrimination, a more in-depth examination 
of the implications for employers and employees is needed in 
order to see how a strict reading of Title VII results in a weak-
ening of the provision. 
At first it may appear as if a strict reading of Title VII is 
beneficial to an employer. It might allow employers to more ef-
 
Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 688–89 (2005) (noting that in 1996 
the EEOC recovered $169.2 million from conciliation and settlement efforts). 
 141. See Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2003) (“First, 
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies serves to put an employer on 
notice of a violation prior to the commencement of judicial proceedings. This in 
turn serves to facilitate internal resolution of the issue rather than promoting 
costly and time-consuming litigation.”). 
 142. See Richter, 686 F.3d at 853; see also supra note 139. 
 143. See Gupta v. E. Tex. State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(“We are reluctant to erect a needless procedural barrier to the private claim-
ant under Title VII, especially since the EEOC relies largely upon the private 
lawsuit to obtain the goals of Title VII.”); Litigation Statistics, supra note 41 
(showing that in Fiscal Year 2011, 66.7 percent of cases were found to have no 
reasonable cause, meaning that the EEOC did not successfully conciliate or 
settle the case, nor did it commence a lawsuit on behalf of the employee). 
 144. Enforcement and Litigation Statistics: Charge Statistics, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ 
charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
 145. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) 
(“Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of employees who 
are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses. . . . Interpreting the 
antiretaliation provision to provide broad protection from retaliation helps en-
sure the cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act’s primary objec-
tive depends.” (citation omitted)). 
  
796 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:775 
 
ficiently retaliate against employees who file charges with the 
EEOC.146 Or, to phrase it less cynically, it may cut down on the 
number of retaliation claims brought before the EEOC because 
an employee may be deterred by the extra time and money it 
would cost to navigate the EEOC process a second time.147
Could a strict reading of Title VII actually be bad for em-
ployers? Some might argue that a second EEOC charge would 
increase litigation costs.
 
148 Additionally, although an employer 
would certainly not want to see a second retaliation claim in 
federal court, barring the retaliation claim would not affect the 
viability of the other claims already reviewed by the EEOC. 
However, employers are more likely to have the resources to 
withstand a lengthy and expensive litigation process.149 There 
could also be cost savings if employers were able to more effi-
ciently retaliate against employees because it could cut down 
on the number of charges or lawsuits brought, as employees ei-
ther might not understand the complexities of a double filing, 
or might be unwilling to take on the costs and risks of a second 
filing.150
 
 146. Cf. Gupta, 654 F.2d at 414 (“Eliminating this needless procedural bar-
rier will deter employers from attempting to discourage employees from exer-
cising their rights under Title VII.”). 
 Ultimately, a strict reading of Title VII is more advan-
tageous than not for employers. 
 147. See id.; Nat’l Org. for Women v. Sperry Rand Corp., 457 F. Supp. 
1338, 1344 (D. Conn. 1978) (noting that requiring a second charge with the 
EEOC for a retaliation claim erects “another procedural barrier to a Title VII 
suit”). 
 148. According to the EEOC, it took an average of six months to investigate 
a charge in 2004. The Charge Handling Process, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPOR-
TUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2013). The addition of a second charge and investigation could add 
upwards of six months more onto the dispute. However, a second investigation 
may not be nearly as lengthy, as the EEOC would have uncovered much of the 
pertinent information already. See Clockedile v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 245 F.3d 
1, 4 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Further, the EEOC has appeared as amicus curae, advis-
ing us that . . . it is ‘likely’ that the alleged retaliation against Clockedile for 
filing her charge would ‘have been uncovered in a reasonable EEOC investiga-
tion’ of the charge.”). 
 149. Some of the concerns about financial burdens for plaintiffs are allevi-
ated by the fact that an employee who prevails in a Title VII dispute can col-
lect attorney’s fees, economic damages, non-economic damages, and punitive 
damages. See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
782, 799–800 (2011) (discussing the damages available in Title VII suits). 
However, this does not necessarily resolve whether litigation costs may dis-
suade aggrieved employees from filing suit, as the prospect of years of litiga-
tion for a mere chance at receiving damages may scare off some individuals 
with shakier claims or evidence. See id. at 790. 
 150. Of course, the procedural barriers of a second filing are not so great 
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3. Implications for Employees 
The first problem for employees under a strict reading of 
Title VII is that it confuses even further the already complex 
statute of limitations scheme.151 Without a strict reading, a 
normal case might look like this: an employer refuses to pro-
mote a female due to her gender. The employee then must file 
her claim with the EEOC within 180 days.152 If the employer re-
taliates against the employee at any time after the filing of the 
charge, pre-Morgan a court would have considered the acts 
substantially related and not require an additional charge.153 
Then, the only other EEOC requirement the employee would 
deal with is ensuring that she filed her lawsuit within ninety 
days after receiving the right-to-sue letter.154
However, if a court follows the strict reading of Title VII, 
the statute of limitations is not as clear. If the employer imme-
diately retaliated against the employee for filing the claim, the 
employee may have a chance to amend her EEOC charge, or 
could instead opt to file an additional charge.
  
155 Either way, the 
employee would have to file the amendment or new charge with 
the EEOC within 180 days of the retaliation in order to be con-
sidered timely.156
 
that an employee would refuse to take on the difficulty and costs of pursuing 
the second claim if the employer obviously retaliated. Cf. id. at 797 n.64 (dis-
cussing how plaintiffs are most likely to sue when optimistic about their suc-
cess). However, employers rarely leave direct evidence of discrimination, leav-
ing employees with the arduous task of proving intent through indirect 
evidence. See Ann C. McGinley, !Viva la Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious 
Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 448–66 (2000) (discuss-
ing the difficulty of proving intent through indirect evidence after recent Su-
preme Court decisions). 
 If there were two concurrent charges, the em-
 151. See Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act, 84 TUL. L. REV. 499, 507 (2010) (“The [EEOC] scheme obviously has 
pitfalls in plenty for the potential plaintiff . . . . It is fair to say that the run-up 
to a Title VII suit is a procedural minefield, which is especially unfortunate 
given that the structure is designed to be initiated by individuals without the 
assistance of private attorneys.”). 
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006). The situation becomes even more 
complex when a state enforcement agency is involved. In that situation, the 
employee must comply with the state statute’s time limitations, and must file 
with the EEOC within 300 days of the unlawful employment practice or with-
in thirty days after termination of the proceedings by the state agency. Id. 
 153. See supra Part I.D.1. 
 154. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e)(1) (2013). 
 155. The regulations require an amendment alleging additional acts which 
constitute unlawful employment practices to be related to or growing out of 
the subject matter of the original charge. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b). 
 156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). 
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ployee would have to make sure that she filed her lawsuit with-
in ninety days of receipt of each right-to-sue letter,157 and then 
either pursue both lawsuits separately or seek a joinder.158 If 
the employer waited to retaliate until the EEOC issued the ini-
tial right-to-sue letter and the employee filed suit, the employee 
would be required to file a new EEOC charge,159 and would then 
be tasked with simultaneously navigating the EEOC process a 
second time and pursuing a claim in federal court.160 Even with 
the added complexity to the process, an employee should be 
able to navigate a double filing with the assistance of compe-
tent counsel. However, not only is it possible for an employee to 
initially navigate the EEOC process without the assistance of 
counsel,161 it is very common.162 Ultimately, the confusions and 
strict deadlines resulting from the above EEOC process make it 
inevitable that some employees will have their retaliation 
claims barred by the statute of limitations.163
In addition to the daunting EEOC procedures, other factors 
may dissuade an employee from filing a second EEOC claim for 
retaliation. First, an employee may feel as if a second EEOC fil-
ing would be useless.
 
164
 
 157. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e)(1). 
 If the first EEOC charge resulted in a 
 158. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a plaintiff to join as many 
claims as she has against an opposing party. FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a). 
 159. See Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 853 (8th Cir. 
2012) (per curiam). 
 160. See id. at 859 (Bye, J., dissenting) (discussing the negative policy im-
plications of requiring a double filing). 
 161. For example, the EEOC publicly states on its website that a com-
plainant does not need to be represented by an attorney in order to file a dis-
crimination complaint. Youth at Work FAQ, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/youth/filingfaq.html#Q2 (last visited Nov. 3, 
2013). 
 162. See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972) (calling a particu-
larly worrisome procedural technicality in Title VII “inappropriate in a statu-
tory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the pro-
cess”); see also Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 30 GA. L. REV. 431, 482 (1996) (examining EEOC proceedings under the 
ADA, and determining that “in many cases, the employer will be represented 
by legal counsel while the employee will not”). 
 163. See Michael Lee Wright, Time Limitations for Civil Rights Claims: 
Continuing Violation Doctrine, 71 TENN. L. REV. 383, 384–85 (2004) (discuss-
ing confusing case law regarding time-barred discrimination claims and how 
employees may fail to timely file). 
 164. See Butts v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 
1402 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Due to the very nature of retaliation, the principle bene-
fits of EEOC involvement, mediation of claims and conciliation, are much less 
likely to result from a second investigation.”), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified 
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federal lawsuit, it is apparent that the EEOC’s conciliatory ef-
forts did not work for the first charge, and would likely not 
work for a second charge either.165 Additionally, an employee 
may feel as if she wants to pursue the retaliation claim, but is 
afraid of the employer retaliating again for the filing of a 
charge, which in turn would necessitate another EEOC 
charge.166 And, of course, there are time and money costs asso-
ciated with a second EEOC filing and a second lawsuit that 
may deter employees or their lawyers from pursuing a retalia-
tion claim.167
It is not as if these concerns about an employee’s rights are 
new; many of these policy arguments were made in pre-Morgan 
cases when the continuing violations doctrine was the norm.
 
168 
However, Morgan and the statutory language of Title VII make 
it clear that the EEOC has mandatory review of all claims aris-
ing under Title VII, and thus that a post-charge retaliatory act 
necessitates a second filing.169
 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in Carter v. New 
Venture Gear, Inc., 310 F. App’x 454, 458 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 Given how this proper reading 
affects the viability of a post-charge retaliation claim, it is evi-
dent that Title VII must be amended in order to ensure the vi-
ability of retaliation claims. 
 165. See Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(“Addressing the facts of [Nealon], we reasoned that . . . because conciliation 
with the [employer] had not improved [the employee’s] position following the 
first EEOC charge, it would not have been likely to do so had she filed a se-
cond charge.” (citing Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992))). 
 166. See Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(“[H]aving once been retaliated against for filing an administrative charge, the 
plaintiff will naturally be gun shy about inviting further retaliation by filing a 
second charge complaining about the first retaliation.”), superseded by statute 
on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), as recognized in 
Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1030 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 167. In an hourly fee billing arrangement, a client may pressure their at-
torney to not file a second claim because of the additional hours that would 
have to be billed. Conversely, in a contingency-fee billing arrangement, an 
employee’s attorney may pressure their client not to file a second claim unless 
the second claim significantly increases the likelihood or amount of a judg-
ment or settlement. For both arrangements, these costs include the costs of 
representing an employee in front of EEOC investigations and conciliation ef-
forts. See The Charge Handling Process, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 
2013). 
 168. See, e.g., Gupta v. E. Tex. State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
 169. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116–17 (2002) 
(discussing the statutory scheme regarding review). 
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III.  AMELIORATING THE HARDSHIPS AND INEQUITY 
CAUSED BY A STRICT READING OF TITLE VII TO 
RETALIATION CLAIMS   
In order to ensure the viability of retaliation claims, this 
Note proposes adding the following language to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(e)(1): “An allegation of retaliation arising from the 
prior filing of a charge under this section shall not require an 
additional filing to, or review by, the Commission.” The narrow 
purpose of this amendment is to exempt post-charge retaliation 
claims from mandatory EEOC review. Doing so essentially 
preempts a future Supreme Court from expanding its principles 
in Morgan to post-charge retaliation claims. Ideally, the 
amendment would return all the circuits to the way they treat-
ed post-charge retaliation before Morgan admonished them to 
follow the strict text of Title VII.  
Why is an amendment necessary? The other obvious solu-
tion would be to let the courts deal with the issue; after all, the 
Fourth Circuit successfully minimized the holding of Morgan to 
not affect a post-charge retaliatory act.170 However, two other 
circuits have explicitly come down on the other side,171 and the 
Supreme Court would have both its own precedent172 and a re-
cent history of conservativeness towards statutory text in em-
ployment law173 to support a strict reading of Title VII. Further, 
the Supreme Court will likely not have a chance to settle the 
split in the near future, as the Court dismissed the petition for 
certiorari pursuant to Rule 46 on March 1, 2013.174 Even it was 
able to hear such a case, the current Court has proven itself 
hostile to complainants under Title VII.175
 
 170. See Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 With a second term 
of President Obama, it is certainly possible that a new liberal 
court could interpret Title VII in favor of a new plaintiff who is 
 171. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam); Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 172. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 101. 
 173. For an exploration of the Supreme Court’s recent conservative ap-
proach to Title VII, particularly concerning Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), see Kathryn A. Eidmann, Comment, Ledbetter in 
Congress: The Limits of a Narrow Legislative Override, 117 YALE L.J. 971, 
972–78 (2008). 
 174. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1391 (2013) (mem.) 
(dismissing petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
46.1). Rule 46.1 of the Supreme Court Rules allows parties to file an agree-
ment to dismiss the case. SUP. CT. R. 46.1.  
 175. See, e.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
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similarly situated to Ms. Richter. However, trying to predict 
the makeup of a future Supreme Court, let alone what their de-
cision on the issue would be, is conjectural at best.176 Instead of 
hoping that a future Supreme Court will skirt around the lan-
guage of Title VII, which the Court in Morgan admonished low-
er courts for doing,177
Some critics might argue that the solution is too narrow, 
and that it solves only a small solution in the larger mess of 
EEOC procedure.
 the better answer is to change the source 
of the issue: the statutory text. 
178 This often is based on the assertion that 
the EEOC lacks resources for effective conciliation or litigation, 
a claim often made by the EEOC itself.179
 
 176. For a recent example, see the conservative reaction to Chief Justice 
Roberts’ decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). See Caroline May, After Obamacare Ruling, Conserva-
tives Turn on Chief Justice Roberts, DAILY CALLER (June 28, 2012, 4:34 PM), 
http://dailycaller.com/2012/06/28/after-obamacare-ruling-conservatives-turn 
-on-chief-justice-roberts (“Our Constitution is dead . . . and we can thank our 
chief justice for that.” (quoting Young America’s Foundation spokesperson Ron 
Meyer)). 
 However, the two ex-
treme solutions—either completely eliminating the EEOC’s 
mandatory review or significantly increasing its funding—
would fundamentally alter the employment litigation process in 
the United States. This note does not propose such radical solu-
tions, and instead operates under the assumption that the 
EEOC will continue to operate under its current level of au-
thority. Alternatively, critics might argue that such a small 
change to Title VII is not worth of Congressional time or atten-
tion. However, a change of similar scope was made in 2009 by 
 177. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 108 (2002) 
(“While the lower courts have offered reasonable, albeit divergent, solutions, 
none are compelled by the text of the statute. In the context of a request to al-
ter the timely filing requirements of Title VII, this Court has stated that ‘strict 
adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the 
best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.’” (quoting Mohasco 
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 907, 826 (1980))). 
 178. See, e.g., Eidmann, supra note 173, at 972, 978 (arguing that overly 
specific amendments to certain parts of Title VII would hinder future discrim-
ination claims and “promote future narrowing of the doctrine interpreting Ti-
tle VII’s EEOC charge provision”).  
 179. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-712, EQUAL EM-
PLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: PILOT PROJECTS COULD HELP TEST SOLUTIONS TO 
LONG-STANDING CONCERNS WITH THE EEO COMPLAINT PROCESS 13 (2009) 
(“Many EEO practitioners across the various practitioner groups identified a 
lack of resources . . . as impeding the timely processing of federal EEO com-
plaints.”). 
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the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.180 The Fair Pay Act of 2009 
amended Title VII to allow the statute of limitations for an 
equal pay lawsuit to renew each time a plaintiff is compensated 
under the discriminatory scheme.181 It was enacted in direct re-
sponse to the Supreme Court’s strict adherence to Title VII’s 
text.182
Other critics might dispute whether the EEOC needs to be 
amended at all. After all, if Title VII is to retain the EEOC’s 
mandatory review of all other charges except for retaliation, 
critics would argue that there is nothing special about retalia-
tion that should exempts it from the EEOC’s notice and concil-
iatory purposes. These critics would argue that conciliation and 
notice play important
 Of course, Congress is more likely to enact legislation 
because of a controversial Supreme Court decision than from a 
seemingly innocuous circuit split. Nevertheless, President 
Obama has shown that he supports employee’s rights in 
amending Title VII, so another amendment could certainly be 
enacted with effective lobbying or political pressure. 
183 and effective roles.184 However, while 
conciliation efforts do remain an essential justification for the 
very existence of a mandatory filing EEOC,185
 
 180. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C. (2006)). Admit-
tedly, the issue of equal pay of women is a much more politically charged issue 
in the national discourse. See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and 
Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
951, 954 (2011) (discussing recent equal-pay lawsuits and highlighting some of 
the public calls for reform). 
 it is harder to 
 181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2006). 
 182. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act § 2, 123 Stat. at 5 (“The Supreme Court 
in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), significantly 
impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation that 
Congress established . . . . The Ledbetter decision undermines those statutory 
protections by unduly restricting the time period in which victims of discrimi-
nation can challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation decisions or 
other practices, contrary to the intent of Congress.”). 
 183. Indeed, in many decisions that enforce the EEOC’s review and inves-
tigation powers, courts note the importance of the EEOC’s conciliatory efforts. 
See Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1509 (11th Cir. 
1985) (“The courts concluded that the emphasis in Title VII on conciliation and 
the legislative history of Title VII indicate that Congress intended Title VII to 
be enforced primarily through conciliation and voluntary compliance.”). 
 184. In fiscal year 2011, the EEOC reported that it successfully settled and 
conciliated 9.8 percent of all cases. See Litigation Statistics, supra note 41. 
 185. For a particularly scathing analysis of the EEOC’s role in employment 
litigation, see Katherine A. Macfarlane, The Improper Dismissal of Title VII 
Claims on “Jurisdictional” Exhaustion Grounds: How Federal Courts Require 
that Allegations Be Presented to an Agency Without the Resources to Consider 
Them, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 213, 238–39 (“Thus, the  
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justify the requirement of a second conciliation effort for the 
sake of uniformity, especially when the first conciliation effort 
so clearly failed.186
  CONCLUSION   
 While conciliation efforts should remain 
necessary in Title VII litigation for most forms of discrimina-
tion, retaliation following an EEOC filing is a unique form of 
discrimination, and Title VII must be amended to ensure that 
employees are protected with a robust anti-retaliation clause. 
Recent court decisions have significantly weakened the vi-
ability of retaliation claims under Title VII. Courts have strug-
gled to find a balance between adhering to the strict language 
of Title VII and upholding the goals and policies of the anti-
discrimination statute. While requiring an aggrieved individual 
to file an additional charge for retaliation ensures that the 
EEOC has an opportunity to review and investigate all claims 
arising under Title VII, it incentivizes employers to retaliate 
against employees who file charges and discourages employees 
from filing additional charges of retaliation. Unfortunately for 
employees, such a strict adherence to the text of Title VII is a 
proper reading of the statute and of Supreme Court precedent. 
The damaging ramifications to an employee’s retaliation 
claims, which are essential for Title VII’s success, necessitate a 
statutory change. A statutory exception of post-charge retalia-
tion from mandatory EEOC review would most effectively re-
solve this conflict. Without this statutory change, Title VII lays 
another significant mine to the already complex procedural 
minefield of employment discrimination litigation. 
 
presentment requirement ignores the realities of Title VII enforce-
ment. . . . Although the EEOC lacks the funds to enforce Title VII in the way it 
was intended to and private plaintiffs are left to stand in its stead, private 
plaintiffs, even those that have the resources which the EEOC lacks to inves-
tigate, are left more restricted than the agency whose role they are perform-
ing.”). 
 186. See Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that a 
second filing was unnecessary because “conciliation with the [employer] did 
not improve her position the first time and would be unlikely to do so a second 
time”). 
